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CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

EXPORT FINANCING, THE INTER-AMERICAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK AND USCARIBBEAN BASIN TRADE
Charles A. T. Skeete*
US-CARIBBEAN BASIN TRADE FLow: AN OVERVIEW

Perhaps no area of United States-Latin American relations better
illustrates the complexity and contradictions as well as the interdependence inherent in the United States' relationship with the area as a whole
than a comparison of US-Latin American with US-Caribbean Basin
trading patterns.
The United States has for many years now, including those of the
past decade, realized a trading surplus with Latin America as a whole.
Indeed, the merchandise balance for what are described as the "Nineteen
American Republics" stood at $2.2 billion in 1976 (the highest for the
decade). By contrast, an interesting feature of US-Caribbean trade is that
the former has sustained a deficit for some time now in its trade with the
latter. Indeed, while the deficit in 1972 amounted to a little over $200
million, the deficit in 1976 stood at just over $2 billion or approximately
ten times its 1972 level. There is little doubt that movements in the prices
of petroleum products and coffee have had substantial impact on the size
of this deficit. The 1974 deficit of $2.5 billion, for example, was five and
one-half times the 1973 deficit of just under $500 million. And yet, the best
markets for U.S. products are Venezuela, Mexico and Colombia and, to a
lesser extent, Ecuador and the Central American Common Market, of
* Alternate Director Barbados, Inter-American Development Bank. Views
expressed are those of the author.
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which all except Ecuador are included in our definition of the Caribbean
Basin.
Even if a definition of the Caribbean Basin is adopted which excludes
the larger continental countries of Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia, a
deficit of some $1.2 million for 1976 is still realized in United States trade
with the rest of the Basin area. Not surprisingly, Venezuela accounted for
some fifty percent of this deficit in 1976, and the CARICOM countries,
which include Trinidad and Tobago (the only other oil-exporting country
of the group), accounted for almost all of the remainder. Yet again, the
Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago are, respectively, the
largest and the fastest growing markets of what may be more narrowly
referred to as the "Caribbean."
Deficits or surpluses notwithstanding, the United States and Latin
America have been for some time, and remain even now, the single most
important markets for each other's products. For example, Latin
American exports to the United States on average accounted for thirtythree percent of all Latin exports between the years 1970-75. Latin
imports from the United States, by comparison, accounted for thirty-six
percent of all imports for the corresponding period. In comparison, the
EEC, which is the second largest trading area for Latin America,
accounted for less than thirty percent for imports or exports.
The nature of US-Caribbean Basin interdependence in the area of
trade is illustrated also by the composition of trade. For the most part,
United States imports from the Basin countries are made up of fuel (fifty
percent) and primary products (twenty-four percent). United States
exports to the area, on the other hand, are made up of machinery and
equipment (forty percent) and manufactured goods (twenty-one percent).
On the export side, the composition of U.S. exports to the Basin area is
not dissimilar to the composition of exports to Latin America as a whole.
TRADE FLOWS AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

United States concern with post-War reconstruction was largely
responsible for the birth of a multilateral framework for the structuring of
world economic relations. As has been pointed out by students of
international economic relations, the "post-War economic system was
organized by Latin America and the Soviet Union."' International
Financial Institutions (IFIs) also played an important role in the post-War
reconstruction.

When the IFIs began to shift their attention from

1. See C. BERGSTEN, R. KEOHANE, AND J. NEYE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS (1975).
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reconstruction to development assistance, a debate arose concerning the
nature and priorities of their economic objectives. The debate has since
intensified because of what some have regarded as the failure of
development assistance to achieve its goals.
The charters of the multilateral institutions, fashioned in the
immediate post-War era, focused on the means of achieving two stated
goals: full employment and growth. These goals are now the subject of
controversy. Much of the dispute, like the unhappiness over the lamented
failure of development assistance, springs from the varying motives of
aid donors. The question of motivation as it concerns US-Caribbean
Basin relations will be addressed in a later section of this paper. Some
attention will now be given to the confusion over means, and between
means and ends as it concerns IFIs and trade flows.
The post-War arrangements established not one, but two different
international financial institutions, namely the World Bank and the IMF,
and a separate multilateral framework designed to regulate and promote
an ordered growth of trade - the GATT. The first to be established and
come into operation was the World Bank or the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. It quickly became an institution for
channeling development assistance in a multilateral framework. The
economic instruments at its disposal, however, were designed with the
goals of economic efficiency and increased productive capacity in mind.
This orientation was due to the well-known conviction, derived from
classical English economics, that development was a problem of capital
accumulation.' The Bank was and is "project-oriented." Even now its
financing is mainly directed toward meeting the foreign exchange costs
of capital goods.
Persons of far greater ingenuity than this writer have expended
considerable intellectual effort to demonstrate that an increase in
productive or industrial capacity has historically been accompanied by
an expansion in world trade, and not the opposite. While admiring their
expertise, I remain unable to make the intellectual leap involved in
concluding that the World Bank, and institutions like it, do significantly
more in the field of trade flows than make possible the export of capital
goods from high-technology centers (developed countries) to lowtechnology centers (developing countries). This is not meant to imply that
there are no benefits from these transfers for recipient countries, but
merely to point out that, unless the IMF and the GATr also adopt
economic instruments specifically designed to facilitate developingcountry exports, expansion in productive capacity will not, by itself, lead
to this result.
2. See H. JOHNSON, THE WORLD ECONOMY AT THE CROSSROADS (1965).
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Partly as a result of what was recognized to be World Bank
deficiencies in dealing with the social aspects of development problems,
and partly, no doubt, because of their long-standing special relationship
with the United States, the nineteen American Republics established,
with U.S. support, the first regional institution of its kind - the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB). This Bank resembles in its essential
features, the World Bank. As indicated, in the debates and negotiations
that preceded its creation, many authorities recognized that the social
integration of the millions of low-income people in Latin America was an
essential condition for faster economic progress in the region. This
concern led to the establishment of a concessional loan window - the
Fund for Special Operations - to enable the institution to finance
activities that may be slow-yielding in the economic sense or have a low
rate of return in the financial sense. This special capability to engage in
concessional lending was reinforced in 1961 when the Bank was
designated by the United States to be the administrator of the Social
Progress Trust Fund whose resources were meant "to support the efforts
of the Latin American countries with a view to achieving greater social
progress and more balanced economic growth."
By December 31, 1977, the cumulative total lending by the Bank in its
seventeen years of operation was approximately $12 billion, net of
cancellations and exchange adjustments. The Bank's lending to Latin
America during 1977 of $1.8 billion exceeded the World Bank's lending to
the region for the corresponding period. As will be further explained in
the following section, many of the regional members of the Bank were of
the opinion at the very beginning that the Bank should include, among
its instruments for raising living standards, a program designed
specifically to promote Latin American exports. That issue was then, and
remains now, the subject to much controversy and sharp disagreement
between donor and borrowing member-countries of the Bank.
THE EXPORT FINANCING SCHEME OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

At the time of its establishment in 1963, the Export Financing
Program of the IDB was limited to financing the export of capital goods
(machinery and equipment) and services to the Latin American or
"regional" member countries of the Bank. Indeed, except for schemes
financed with the resources of the Venezuelan Trust Fund, the program
was and is designed to finance intra-regional trade. It is not possible
under the program, for example, to finance exports to the United States.
Initially, the program was confined to medium-term financing (between
180 days and five years) of capital goods and services. It has since been
expanded to allow short-term financing of certain manufactured and
semi-manufactured goods such as fertilizers and construction materials.
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Under a separate program, financed with resources from the
Venezuelan Trust Fund, a number of new features have been introduced,
aimed at overcoming the limitations of the program just described. Under
the Trust Fund it is possible, for instance, to finance the following: a)
exports of capital goods outside the region; b) exports of manufactured
and semi-manufactured goods to all member countries of the IMF and
Switzerland; and, c) in the case of the least developed of the borrowing
members of the Bank, exports of an even wider category of goods than is
permitted under a) and b) above (a wide category of primary products).
Under both programs, the Bank's role is financial rather than "tradeoriented" and the Bank has no operational relations at the country level
with exporters or importers. Briefly, the Bank's Export Financing
Program is a "rediscount mechanism" for nontraditional export paper
held by borrowing countries. For this reason, the Bank insists that its
relations be limited to an institution at the country level which deals in
such paper - usually a Central Bank.
The combined programs (Regular and Venezuela Trust Fund) have
enabled the Bank to make some thirty-four loans or credits totalling
approximately $200 million to Latin American member countries of the
Bank to finance total exports in the approved categories with an invoice
value of approximately $300 million. In addition, much assistance has
been directed towards helping member countries organize and strengthen
their national systems for the financing of exports.
Under the Program, for the first ten years, lending amounted to a
little over $100 million for nineteen credit operations, financing exports of
an invoice value of approximately $156 million. Both the number of
credits financed and the total value of those credits approximately
doubled during the three year period between 1974 and 1977. It was in
these three years that important modifications to the Program were
introduced. It would seem reasonable to deduce, therefore, that relaxation
of the limitation on the category of goods which could be financed has
had a substantial impact on the demand for this type of financing within
the region. Limited experience with the Venezuela Trust Fund also
suggests that the removal of the limitation on the destination of exports
could likewise have a substantial impact on the demand for this type of
financing.
From the beginning, considerable controversy surrounded the
operation by the IDB of an export financing program. The program was
eventually introduced within the context of the canons that govern
development financing by an institution such as the IDB. For example,
the IDB suggests that it was established to foster development essentially
through project operations. However, over ten years of experience in
operating an export financing program within the limitations imposed by
a development bank framework has persuaded borrowing countries of the
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Bank that the goal of facilitating regional exports on terms competitive
with developed countries should be pursued by means of an institution
established precisely for that purpose. The Region has made substantial
progress towards the establishment of an independent institution which
would deal in the rediscounting of export credit papers for exports of all
categories to all destinations.
US-CARIBBEAN

RELATIONS

As pointed out by Frank and Baird, 3 donor country motivations for
granting aid seem to fall into four main categories:
1. Achievement of greater national security;
2. Fulfillment of humanitarian obligations to provide assistance
to less fortunate nations and peoples;
3. Economic gains brought about either through opening and
maintaining access to less-developed country markets on favorable
terms or through ensuring access to raw material supplies; and
4. Diplomatic gains achieved through the expansion of national
prestige and power.
It is only fair to state that U.S. aid efforts in the Caribbean and
elsewhere have not been driven by a single motivation. In fact, it is
difficult to identify what these motivations are.4 This difficulty arises at
any given point in time and borders on the insurmountable when viewed
over any significant period of time. Are executive branch motivations, on
the one hand, and congressional motivations, on the other, one and the
same in the field of development assistance? For example, how does the
recipient, let alone a third party, view the continuation of military
assistance and the denial of development assistance (and vice versa) to
different countries at the same time? Still again, how can the alternating
phases of neglect and assistance in the Caribbean be explained? 5
One can of course strike safe ground and contend that, in the
Caribbean Basin and elsewhere, U.S. motivations are marked by security,
humanitarian, economic and diplomatic considerations. This mix of
motivations is made more complex by regarding the thirty odd countries
that make up the Caribbean Basin as some kind of unit. The explanation
for this would seem to be justified only on geographical or security

3. See C.

PROSPECTS

FRANK &

M.

BAIRD, FOREIGN AID: ITS SPECKLED PAST AND FUTURE

(date unavailable).

4. See K. SILVERT, THE CARIBBEAN AND
5. I. HAWKINS, THE CHANGING FACE OF

NORTH AMERICA (1977).
THE CARIBBEAN (1976).
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grounds. It is difficult, for example, to be convinced that U.S. perceptions
of its relations with Mexico are in any meaningful respect similar to the
perceptions of its relations with Barbados or Anguilla.
The foregoing observations are outlined in order to make a point
which, were it not for its historical neglect, would seem too obvious to be
worthy of laboring. To be successful, United States initiatives in the area
should be marked by consistency and continuity. Yet, the present
Caribbean view of U.S. initiatives is that they are propelled, in the main,
by periodic "discoveries" of the area. Mindful of the fact that we in the
Caribbean anticipate a stable international presence for the Basin in the
future, involvement in well-informed dialogue should be advantageous to
all parties concerned.

